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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN H. JONES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE INDUS'PRIAL COMMISSION 
lW UTAH and 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT'S 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 
10302 
This proceeding seeks a review of a decision of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah denying the claim of the 
petitioner and applying the three year statute of limit-
ations as contained in Section 35-1-99, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
RELIEF SOlffiHT 
The respondents seek an affirmance of the decision 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
1 
STATEMENl1 OF FACTS 
While the respondents generally agree with thf' 
statement of facts submitted by the petitioner , , ve are 
of the opinion that the statement is too abbreviateJ tn 
fully apprise this Court of the material facts involwd 
herein. 
The accident here involved occurred on August ~!I, 
1958. The petitioner was ref erred to Dr. 0. W. Phelps 
who treated him until September 29, 1958, when he was 
discharged as cured. (Tr. 8) 
The record next shows a request by the petitiow·r 
to change doctors which request was granted by t\11· 
Industrial Commission of Utah on June 13, 19GO. (Tr.10) 
During the next several months, the petitioner re-
ceived treatments from Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, including 
a mylogram performed at St. Marks Hospital on July 
29, 1960. (Tr. 15) Dr. Holbrook's final report is dated 
August 31, 1961, and shows a final treatment on Septem-
ber 10, 1960. The bill submitted "·ith this letter from 
Dr. Holbrook was paid on September 15, 19Gl. (Tr. 30) 
The next entry in the Industrial Commission record 
is the petitioner's Application for a hearing which \1-a' 
received by the Commission on February 10, 19fi.t 
(Tr. 16) 
A hearing was held on this Application on June 1 
· 1Tr 1964, and the reporter's transcript of that heanng · 
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,11) to 29) reaffirms the factual matters set out above· 
- ' 
1wd on September 3, 1964, the petitioner's claim was 
denird by reason of the three year statute of limitations. 
1 
Tr. 63) The statements in the petitioner's brief as to 
the rehearing and the dates of the orders with respect 
thereto are correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT I. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
WAS NOT FILED WITHIN THE TIME LIMITED BY SEC-
TION 35-1-83, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
As is indicated by petitioner's brief, the sole ques-
tion for determination here is the interpretation to be 
placed upon the words "after notice" and particularly 
whether time commences to run from the date of mail-
ing such notice or from its receipt and what is required 
to determine the fact. And, in connection with this 
problem, it must be noted that the final sentence of Rule 
5(b) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads that: 
''Service by mail is completion on mailing." 
The \vords "after notice" were added by amendment 
lo the statute in 1941. Prior to that date the decisions 
of this Court uniformly held that notice was not neces-
sary and the thirty-day period commenced to run with 
the day the application for rehearing was denied. Since 
the am.mdment, this Court has not been called upon to 
interpret the meaning of the added words. 
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The petitioner contends for an interpretat· 
1011 l•j 
the present language that would require actual · recE>1pt 
of such notice by the party involved. 'Ve believe that 
such a contention leaves a good aeal to be desired in th1· 
conduct of the affairs of the Industrial Commission an<l 
would effectively require of them an affirmative (lPj
1
•
1 
mination in each instance that notice of all decisiom wa~ 
actually placed in the hands of the parties involwd. 
The text writers do not agree upon the meaning t .. 
be ascribed to these words and particularly is thm a 
conflict when decisions under H ule 5 ( b) ( 1) are con 
side red. 
'Ve would call attention to the recent case of !llosln; 
Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, reported as 354 P.2d 848, 11 
Utah 2d 41, and decided on August 16, 1960. In that 
case Section 73-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, \\'a.' 
under consideration and this section requirPs that a 
notice be sent to an applicant by registered mail. fa 1· 
ure to heed this notice can and did result in the loss of 
a valuable water right; and it was contended that tl:i· 
statute contemplated actual notice to the applicant aml 
that a showing that such notice was not receiwd ~honl:l 
operate to relieve the applicant of his default. Thi, 
Court, however, held that the mailing of such notice li:. 
the State Engineer con~tituted compliance \\'ith thi· 
statute and that the time for action cmmnenced tu nm 
from such time. 1'he Court said: 
"The legislature has the right to mah .re~­
sonahle regulations as to public or legal noti('e>. 
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and the statutory requirements must be complete-
ly met in order to effect a valid notice. In re-
quiring the State Engineer to notify the appli-
eant by rcgistere>d mail, it provided for a notice 
n•asonahly calenlated, under all circumstances, to 
apprise the applicant of the date proof was to be 
due." 
~we rri-ipectfully submit that the statute requires 
that the application for the writ of certiorari must be 
filed within thirty days from and aft~r the decision of 
the Industrial Commission when the record reasonably 
shows that notice of such decision was given by mail 
on such <late. 
POINT II 
POINT II. THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION IS BARRED 
BY THE THREE YEAR PERIOD OF LIMITATION AS SET 
our IN SECTION 35-1-99, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
In construing this section following its enactment 
in 19:\9, this Court in McKee v. Industrial Commission, 
20G P.'.!d 715, 115 Utah 550, said: 
"This statute ... provides that unless an 
application for compensation is filed with the In-
dustrial Commission within three years from the 
dat<> of the accident or the date of the last pay-
1t1rnt of compensation the right to compensation 
is hanw1. The language of the statute is clear 
arnl lPavt>s no room for doubt. Regardless of the 
d('('isions rendered by this court prior to 1939, 
tlw law now is that the limitation statute begins 
to run from the date of the accident or from the 
date> of the last payment of compensation." 
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· The Industrial Commision denied the claim of lhi 
petitioner here on the grounds that a three-year period 
had intervened between the last payment of compen. 
sation and the claim filed with the commission on Febru 
ary 10, 1964. Petitioner seeks to avoid the f'ffects of thi.< 
statute by relying upon a payment to the doctor on 
September 16, 1961 even though the last service rendered 
by the doctor to the petitioner occurred on September 
10, 1960, a year earlier. 
The conumss10n very concisely pointed out the 
abuses that could occur should the payment of the doctor 
hill be the controlling factor. Without admitting that tlw 
service rendered by the doctor in this case constitutr·' 
compensation within the meaning of the statute, 1'.1· 
are firmly of the opinion that payment of the doctor bill 
was not. 
In support of this contention, we call attention t0 
Section 35-1-81, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which rearl~ 
as follows: 
"In addition to the compensation provided 
for in this title the employer ... shall in ordinary 
cases also be required to pay such a re~sonable 
sum for medical, nurse and hospital services, and 
for medicines, and for such artificial means and 
appliances as may be necessar!r to tr~at the P.~­
tient as in the judgment of the mdustnal con!Il11~-
sion may be just .... " 
And the case of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Pack 1111' 
Corp., 196 P.2d 487, 113 Utah 415, holds that compensa-
tion as used in the act means : 
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''any payment required by the act to be made to a 
workman or to his dependents, or for their bene-
fit, or into the state treasury for the special pur-
poses of the compensation act. This includes dis-
ability payments, death benefits, medical and 
hospitalization expenses, burial expenses, and 
payments into the state treasury as provided by 
the act." 
We submit that the order of the Industrial Com-
mission under date of June 13, 1960, authorizing the 
petitioner to obtain the services of Dr. Holbrook obli-
gated the respondent to pay for such services. Certainly 
if any compensation was then paid the petitioner, it 
was by reason of the rendering of such ser:vice by Dr. 
Holbrook. The payment for such service, whenever made 
by the respondent, was no benefit whatever to the pe-
titioner and no compensation under the act. 
A substantial number of jurisdictions have held that 
the furnishing of medical expenses and of hospital bills 
by an employer is not the payment of compensation that 
11'ill toll the statute of limitations; and this is particularly 
true where, as in Utah, payment for such service is man-
datory under the statute. The reason is, of course, ob-
vious and is well stated in Volume 12 of Schneider's 
text on \Vorkmen's Compensation at page 27, which reads 
as follows: 
"Where the statute does not specifically 
provide that the statute is tolled by the last medi-
cal service, the providing of medical services to 
an injured employee with, or without considera-
tion of the question of whether the injury is com-
JWnsable is considered 'an act of mercy which no 
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co.ur! should_ hold in any respect is an implied ad. 
m1ss10n or circumstance tending to admit li"ab'l't 
* * *It . 11 Y · cannot be said that when an employer d 
what the Act requires or permits him to do o~s 
thereby perforce admits liability and waives' the 
protective provisions of the statute enacted in h'e beh~lf.' The limitation provision is not waiv:~ 
nor is the employer estopped to claim the limita-
tion by providing such medical service." 
The cases there cited from North Carolina, FloriJa, 
Georgia, Illinois, Vermont, Pennsylvania and Colorado 
support this rule; and an Iowa case, Powell v. Bestwal/ 
Gypsimi Co., reported at 124 N.vV. 2d 448, also holds that 
the payment of medical expenses and hospital bills for 
injured employees, being mandatory under the statute, 
did not toll the statute of limitations. 
There is, however, another line of cases from other 
jurisdictions holding that the furnishing of hospital 
or medical services is the payment of compensation and 
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until after the last date on which such service was rend 
ered. An annotation at 144 ALR 606 discusses generally 
the fact situations that will keep a claim alive and spe-
cifically at pages 617 and 620 discusses, respectiwly, 
cases holding that the furnishing of medical or hospital 
services do and do not toll the limitation statute. 
We submit that the basis for holding that the furn-
ishing of medical service should toll the statute is bes! 
stated in a California case, Pacific Employers InsiirancP 
Company v. Industrial Accident Commission, 152 P. 2d 
501, where the Court said: 
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"Pay1m·nt of ~co1npem;ation' within this sec-
tion indudes payment or furnishing of medical 
can·, hospitalization, or otht'r benefits recoverable 
unJt•r the Code. The objective policy of this 
portion of the Code is the protection of the in-
jur<'d employe(~ from being lulled into a sense oi 
,;ecurity by voluntary payment of benefits until 
the time to commence formal proceedings 'vith the 
('Ollllllission has expired. So far as the policy of 
ilw :-;tatute is concerned it makes no difference 
wliPtlwr these benefits are paid under a confession 
of legal liability or not. The deciding factor is 
that the Pmployee has been paid and is therefore 
11ot rnov<'d to commence legal proceedings to en-
force his claim.'' 
Clearly, this reasoning supports only the rendering 
of the service and not the payment of the bill for such 
sPnict> the date of which payment in the ordinary course 
of events \nmld be wholly unknown to the injured work-
man. 
N" one of the cases that ·we have examined has held 
1ltat tlw statute is tolled by the payment for the medical 
expense ratlH•r than the furnishing of such service and we 
submit that this is proper and supported by sound r<':-
rnni ng and sound public policy. 
And, finally, we submit that the payment of a doctor 
hill for \Yhieh the petitioner had no liability confers no 
l1cw·fit npon him and cannot under any legal theory 
r·onstitnte the lJayment of compensation which wonld 
to1! the statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully subnutted that the application for 
the writ of certiorari was filed too late to give this 
Court jurisdiction of this appeal and it is also submittt>d 
that the statute of limitations for the filing of claims 
for compensation is applicable to this case and that the 
decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. GERALD IRVINE and 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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